Un-Disguised Discrimination: A Critique of Poland’s Refugee Policy vis-à-vis the Belarus Border Crisis - I

By Aditya Maheshwari, a third year law student at NLSIU, Bangalore.

---

Introduction

In March 2025, Poland suspended asylum rights along the Belarus border to thwart what it termed as an ‘instrumentalisation of migration,’ owing to its deliberate and hostile facilitation by the Belarusian government. The suspension however, exempted those at a ‘real risk of harm’ such as children, the disabled, those requiring medical attention, etc. More recently in October 2025, a Polish provincial court, while denying asylum to a Sudanese applicant, observed that the suspension was lawful and justified. In another instance, an applicant was unsuccessful in claiming asylum even though he was languishing in very poor health. The legislative move sparked scathing criticisms from human rights commentators, who accused Poland of violating its obligations of international protection. This law also highlights a recent, more deep-seated issue of discrimination in Polish refugee policy, wherein millions of Ukrainians have been granted protection, while asylum seekers from Middle Eastern nations who are merely in some thousands have faced brutal pushbacks at the Poland-Belarus border. It is also well-known that migrants arriving from Belarus have encountered relentless push-back practices by Poland long before the 2021 summer crisis, as documented by international human rights bodies. Tragically, over a hundred people were dying and more than 1,600 were being placed in detention as the crisis panned out.

This article critiques the aforementioned trend in Polish policy considering the fact that Poland is a signatory to the landmark 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘1951 Refugee Convention’). While drawing parallels with the Ukrainian refugee situation, this article advocates for non-discriminatory and equal policy for all asylum seekers in Poland. Thereafter, this article transitions into a broader critique of certain legal frameworks and standards that may be susceptible to misuse against Muslim asylum seekers in light of the current, right-wing rhetoric against such migrants in Poland. Lastly, a major section proposes pragmatic solutions to the Belarus border crisis that Polish society as a whole could implement without compromising on Convention ideals. Poland’s economic, demographic and even security concerns can be adequately addressed without discriminatory asylum practices or politics of exclusion. It is also pointed out how the recommendations could eventually benefit Poland itself if the nation decides to implement certain existing laws and undertake legislative amendments in harmony with the same.

Critiquing Poland’s Policies of Exclusion

A major concern with the 2025 Amendment to the Act on Granting Protection to Foreigners is that it fails to address root causes of the migration from Belarus. It is indispensable to comprehend that Belarus was accused of weaponising the plight of asylum seekers, luring them to travel on to EU countries in retaliation against EU sanctions. However, these asylum seekers are themselves active actors fleeing Middle Eastern conflict theatres in pursuit of a better life. In the words of none but a Polish Left political party, they too deserve help and solidarity as war refugees and miserable human beings. The fact that their suffering is being weaponised by Belarus towards geopolitical ends however, does not exonerate Poland from its unfortunate exacerbation of the stand-off. It punished the refugees, instead of engaging directly with the Belarusian dispensation.

Moreover, Poland is not a destination but a mere transit country for a vast number of refugees who seek asylum in other, more receptive EU states. In fact, surveys in Africa have revealed that only a small share of asylum seekers from the region are actually interested in reaching Europe as a whole. Even for those claiming asylum, Polish border guards can start registering/processing applications on a meticulous and genuine case-by-case basis at the Belarus border itself. Also, the country’s current aversion to Middle Eastern refugees seems outlandish and politically motivated because in 2015, a more liberal Polish government had agreed to accept 6,800 refugees fleeing Eritrea and Syria. Additionally, the country even took in thousands of Middle Easterners who were among the 157,000 non-Ukrainians fleeing Ukraine. One study also points to how Europeans in general became more empathetic to refugee groups other than Ukrainians after Russia invaded Ukraine. Overall, the number of Muslim (such as Iraqi and Syrian) refugees in Poland before the Belarus crisis was only in some thousands as per 2018 data, thus, it is opined that a few thousand more border crossings and subsequent settlement of Muslim refugees cannot satisfy qualms about a substantial alteration of Polish demography along religious lines. After all, 60-75 percent of the immigrants in Poland are Ukrainians while those from the Middle East are nowhere among the list of most populous immigrants. In fact, the total number of Muslim residents in Poland is only around 60,000 as per sources quoted by Alia Abu Rebiah, a humanitarian lawyer who has worked with refugees in Poland. The aforementioned tranche of evidence further undermines the Polish state’s blanket national security contentions in favour of the law. As per Alia Rebiah, who was also consulted for this article, there is no cogent evidence of security breaches or increased crime linked to Middle Eastern refugees. The Polish far right, anti-Muslim rhetoric is primarily political and perception-driven rather than being based on factual data. The same is unjust and leads to policies of securitisation premised on fears, prejudices, Islamophobia and even racism.

On the other hand, Poland passed the 2022 Assistance Act which granted refuge (temporary protection) and a range of socio-economic rights to millions of Ukrainian refugees. Even presently, over a million Ukrainians have been granted protection in Poland. Under the broader EU Temporary Protection Directive, Ukrainians and their family members (from any, even Middle Eastern nationalities) can seek extended refuge. All the while, legislations, states of emergencies and blockade of humanitarian aid were propelling expulsions of a few thousand “migrants” at the Belarus border, for whom there is barely any robust protection framework within the broader EU context and which unfortunately gives Poland more leeway to perpetuate discrimination. This stark contrast in policy towards two refugee groups with distinct faiths and nationalities is overtly violative of Article 3 of the 1951 Convention, which calls on State parties to espouse non-discrimination irrespective of the migrants’ religion/race/country of origin. Furthermore, harsh pushbacks of Muslim migrants explicitly imploring asylum without due process impinges on Article 31 of the Convention, which advocates for fair treatment of all entrants- even the illegal yet bona fide ones who have presented themselves as such without delay. Thus, NGOs and human rights bodies argue that Poland is in breach of international as well as EU law- such as the Pact on Migration and Asylum. Indeed, as a result of Poland’s relentless crackdowns, multiple people (including children) have died of starvation and freezing conditions at the Belarus border. Even children have been deported back to Belarus in yet another mockery of Convention ideals of family unity and protection of children as well as Poland’s own legal safeguards. These include special procedures for protecting unaccompanied minors and a Warsaw Administrative Court ruling on protection of child rights. The same is also an unacceptable contravention of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which seeks to guarantee people’s basic rights and ensure adequate living conditions for asylum seekers. Core tenets of the right to life and dignity under the cornerstone UDHR have also been impinged on in the said case. In light of the same, Polish State practice appears ironic as is evident from its UNGA stance that allegations of discrimination are a horrible lie and an insult to their nation.

The recent law is also an escalation from the 2021 Amendments to the 1997 Aliens Act. Those amendments allegedly encouraged forced/collective expulsions and undermined the rights of asylum seekers to access domestic legal remedies. Moreover, another 2021 amendment to a 2003 law on Granting Protection to Aliens within the Territory of the Republic of Poland facilitated rejections of asylum applicants from Belarus as they were not ‘directly coming from a life/freedom threatening origin country.’All three laws are unambiguously antagonistic to Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention, which sanctify customary principles of non-expulsion and non-refoulment. Yet, Polish authorities are forcing them back into Belarus. In that context, the 2025 law’s ‘real risk of harm’ exception seems unwarranted, vague and a just, purposive implementation of the same could be dubious since almost all refugees at the border are clearly at real risk of harm. In any case, Poland’s current asylum regime is overtly racialised and limited and/or selective in compliance with protection obligations as their law itself is designed to exclude. Through the same, Poland has also disregarded Article 56 of its own Constitution, which affirms statutory rights to asylum in Poland through internationally binding and ratified agreements such as the 1951 Convention.

Criticism Towards the Misuse of Certain Laws

In a 2007 survey, 70-80 percent of Polish respondents opined that they would be open to admitting people from different ethnicities or nationalities into the country, with social integration and even citizenship rights. However, public opinion, particularly towards Muslim refugees became sceptical after the 2015 migrant crises. As per Alia Rebiah, Muslim refugees garner far less public sympathy than the almost 50 percent for culturally similar Ukrainians. Unfortunately, 80 percent of Poles also believe that accepting Middle Easterners would increase risks of terrorist attacks in the country. According to the Aliens Act, asylum may be granted when the same is in the best interests of Poland. It is contended that the said standard could be employed to exclude Muslim applicants through the garb of aforementioned democratic opinion or the country’s demographic homogeneity if not through fringed far right or overt State-spearheaded racism. This is evident from the fact that in 2020, even before the border crisis had begun, out of 2,803 asylum applicants- only a paltry 161 were granted refugee status.

Secondly and insidiously, the Assistance Act did not classify Ukrainians as refugees but granted them ‘temporary protection’ so that it would not have to comply with Convention articles on universality. It is thus inferred that when favourably perceived Ukrainians are not protected fully, any prospects for Muslims could be tragically grim- extremely temporary, inadequate, arbitrary and certainly with no regard for international standards.

Thirdly, according to a 2015 law, all foreigners are viewed as particularly suspicious and the regulations envisage unrestricted surveillance, arbitrary detentions and ineffective legal defence against the same. Coupled with the ostensibly broad discretionary invocations of national security/public order under Article 32 of the Convention, the said law could become an effortless tool to single out and detain/expel Muslims even if they are initially admitted. However, such an approach would still defeat Article 16 of the Convention, which should be read to include access to courts/due process of law in substance and not merely in form. It would also be in conflict with Article 8, which calls for exempting foreign nationals/refugees from such exceptional measures against person and property. As a counterclaim, Poland could rely on Article 9 to argue that crises with Belarus amount to grave and exceptional circumstances and thus warrant provisional security measures. However, as opined before, it is questionable whether a crisis entailing helpless, persecuted migrants at the forefront can really amount to the threshold of severe security jeopardies.

Fourthly, a Polish guideline stipulates that people who leave a refugee centre without the consent of its head will not be readmitted and lose access to beneficial rights. Albeit and apparently intended to avert logistical fiascos, it is observed that the same should not turn into a mechanism for sequestering certain populations and condoning anti-integration practices. After all, asylum seekers in the EU, especially the Muslim ones, are increasingly understood as terrorists and welfare leeches who should be held as far away as possible from the proper citizenry. If and when applicants at the Belarus border are granted asylum, their freedom of movement under Article 26 of the Convention should not be curtailed by centre heads with ulterior political motives.